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Abstract In a model where individuals differ in both their health care needs and their
lifestyle preferences, we examine the fair provision of health care when those who
regret their initial decisions are granted a fresh start. By considering that each agent
chooses how to allocate a given amount of resources betweenmedical and non-medical
consumption,we characterise the schemeof taxes andhealth treatments thatmaximises
social preferences. These preferences allow the planner to make welfare assessments
when it is acceptable to compensate agents who have changed their preferences and/or
who are endowedwith a badmedical disposition.We show that the optimal tax scheme
does not only pay additional treatments for those who are not in a good health state,
but also protectively induces agents to reduce their non-medical consumption in order
to limit a possible future regret.
Keywords Health · Lifestyle preferences · Fairness · Fresh start · Taxation
JEL Classification D63 · D71 · H20 · I10
1 Introduction
The idea of a fresh start defends compensating those who have changed their pref-
erences and hence regret their past choices. Although the issues of health and the
provision of health care have attracted a lot attention recently, they have been barely
studied in relation to such an idea. In this paper we study how the interaction between
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the ethical concept of fresh starts and basic notions of fairness affects the optimal
design of an incentive-compatible tax scheme which aims to provide extra health care
to those who may need it.
The forgiving ethical view that advocates giving those who regret their previous
choices a fresh start is a controversial one (see Arneson 1989; Dworkin 2000, 2002;
Fleurbaey 2002, 2005a, 2008). Some authors are reluctant to endorse this view as
they consider that it may entail both incentive and moral issues (e.g., Arneson 1989;
Dworkin 2002). Their argument is twofold. On the one hand, these authors claim that
helping those who have mismanaged their resources generates incentive problems, as
some individualsmay fake regret in order to receive extra resources. On the other hand,
such authors also consider that it is unfair to help regretful individuals for a frugality
they have never practised. This would allow the spendthrift to ‘have the proverbial
cake and eat it too’ (see Dworkin 2002).
All these arguments against fresh starts have been disputed by Fleurbaey (2005a,
2008). First of all, he argues that if providing individuals with a fresh start were
completely free, basically no-one would be against this principle. Consequently, the
moral criticisms seem to be only valid in cases in which fresh starts entail a cost to
others. Moreover, the idea of charging costs to other individuals is not only defended
by this ideal, but by any redistribution policy as well. Second, in terms of efficiency
Fleurbaey (2005a, 2008) also shows that a properly designed incentive-compatible
fresh start policy limits any possible ‘undeserved’ compensation that individualsmight
receive from misreporting their real preferences. Additionally, he argues that this
policy would increase freedom as individuals would no longer be forced to bear the
consequences of their early choices.
Together with this idea of forgiveness and fresh starts, in this paper we also consider
the issue of compensating individuals who are endowed with different traits. The
most relevant theories of fairness and responsibility argue that inequalities in agents’
outcomes may contain elements for which those agents are responsible, but also other
elements they should not be held responsible for. The aim of such theories is to reduce
only the outcome differences that originate in factors for which individuals cannot be
held responsible (e.g., Rawls 1971; Dworkin 1981a, b; Arneson 1989; Cohen 1989;
and Roemer 1998).
The objective of this paper is to study the optimal distribution of medical and
non-medical consumption that results from the implementation of a public policy
that endorses these two ethical principles, forgiveness and fair compensation. The
reason to focus our analysis on the issue of health is that there is a large consensus
that it is one of the most crucial dimensions of the individual well-being, and hence
its allocation cannot be analysed as the distribution of other alternative goods such as
consumption (e.g., Fleurbaey and Schokkaert 2011). Moreover, as regards forgiveness
it is not infrequent to observe the implementation of the idea of a fresh start to real-life
situations in which health is involved. An example of this kind of implementation is
any public health system, which usually treats all those individuals who are in a bad
health condition, regardless of their lifestyle. Interestingly enough, some countries are
recently starting to defend the opposite view in order to reduce the cost of health care.
Specifically, they propose limiting the right to health care of those who do not stop
leading an unhealthy lifestyle.
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These two ethical principles that we endorse have been separately analysed by
previous works (e.g., Fleurbaey 2005a, b). In a recent paper, Calo-Blanco (2014) pro-
poses a way of combining forgiveness and fair compensation in a model in which
individuals differ in both their health care needs and their preferences over health
and consumption. Specifically, he derives a social ordering function that gives the
highest priority to that agent with the largest level of a specific measure of individual
well-being loss. Such a measure is defined as the difference that exists, in terms of
a hypothetical consumption, between the individual’s current situation and the ideal
choice she would have made with her true ex post preferences if she had the most
favourable health disposition possible. Given the way in which this value is defined it
is possible to reach a compromise between compensating individuals endowed with
a poor medical disposition, and granting those who regret their initial choice a fresh
start.
Nevertheless, an important question that yet remains to be addressed is the impli-
cation that the adoption of a particular social ordering function accounting for a fresh
start has for the design of the optimal taxation policy. Following Mirrlees’ (1971)
seminal contribution, many papers have studied the issue of social welfare and opti-
mal taxation (e.g., Atkinson 1995; Diamond 1998). However, many of these papers
have resorted to a specific choice of both social evaluation and individual utility func-
tions, and hence their results are only robust to the particular specification they have
assumed. By contrast, a recent branch of the literature has focused on the theory of
optimal taxation from a more general viewpoint. More precisely, such a branch resorts
to social value judgments that are defined by means of fairness conditions, which
consider only individual non-comparable ordinal preferences. The most representa-
tive models of this last approach are due to Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2006, 2007).
Assuming that individuals differ in both their preferences and their labour skills, the
main objective of these papers is to provide criteria for the characterisation of the
optimal fair tax scheme over observable income levels. They conclude that, in order
to maximise social welfare, the optimal scheme should focus on a particular region
of the budget set that is attainable by a specific type of agent. An extension of this
framework is proposed by Valletta (2014), who analyses the joint taxation of income
and health expenditure in a model in which agents have heterogeneous preferences
over consumption, labour and health.
By assuming this recent approach to optimal taxation, in this paper we study the
overall distribution of consumption and medical expenditure that results from a fresh
start policy that is implemented via a particular tax scheme. This policy is designed to
satisfy the social preferences that minimise the individual well-being loss as defined
in Calo-Blanco (2014). However, such social preferences are derived in a first-best
framework in which health states and medical dispositions are observable, something
that is usually ruled out in taxationmodels (see Valletta 2014). Therefore, we adapt our
analysis to a second-best scenario inwhich only the distribution of the total expenditure
on health and consumption is observable, considering this way that the tax scheme has
to be defined as monetary transfers that depend on this distribution alone. Specifically,
agents are taxed as a function of their consumption, and as a consequence they may




Although the analysis of any policy for a population which is heterogeneous in
several dimensions is a difficult task, in this paper we present a characterisation of
the optimal (tax-treatment) fresh start policy and the allocation that it generates. The
first conclusion we reach is that the policy defines an optimal balance between paying
additional health treatments and putting protective constraints on early individual
non-medical decisions (by means of a consumption tax) to limit the possibility of
a future regret. This result can be used as a solution to the recent public discussion
about how to deal with those who refuse to lead a healthy lifestyle. Specifically, to
avoid having an ‘unfair’ society that limits the right to health care, which is a pivotal
element of the individual well-being, our fresh-start policy advocates limiting instead
the individuals’ ability to fully enjoy their preferences. This solution is in line with the
arguments proposed by Fleurbaey (2005a) that defend the idea of a fresh start. The
second outcome of our characterisation results is that the scope of the fresh start policy
is limited by the informational constraints of the model. As a result of this limitation
the planner cannot guarantee the goal of perfect equality in terms of individual well-
being. This is so because such informational constraints allow those agents endowed
with a good medical disposition to apply for low tax rates and extra health treatments
that are originally intended to help those with higher health care needs. The third main
conclusion we obtain is that the largest well-being loss is defined by the specific shape
of the set of the indifference curves associated with each type of preferences, and not
by the ‘size’ of the change between ex ante and ex post preferences. This is so because
the equivalent measure that we use to compare well-being losses is specifically defined
for each type. Finally, under an additional assumption about individual preferences,
we show that the agent who pays the highest tax is someone who makes her choice
with the preferences that show the largest concern for health, that is, someone who
does not regret her choice.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic elements
of themodel, including the social preferences that society endorses. Section 3 develops
the characterisation of the optimal tax scheme. Additionally, it displays the numerical
computation for a particular parameter configuration of the model. Section 4 offers
the conclusions of this study. All proofs are contained in the appendix.
2 The model
Let us consider a population that consists of a finite set of individuals N =
{1, . . . , i, . . . , n}. In this economy only two goods are available, namely consump-
tion and health. Consumption is understood as the expenditure on non-medical goods,
c ∈ R+, while health is a variable that ranges from 0 (full ill-health) to 1 (perfect
health), that is, h ∈ H = [0, 1]. Let h∗ := 1 denote the state of perfect health.
Individuals have three different traits, namely their medical disposition, their initial
resources and their preferences.
Every agent i ∈ N is characterised by a medical disposition mi ∈ R++ which
defines the amount of medical expenditure mih ∈ R+ that she needs to invest to
reach a given health state h ∈ H . For ease of exposition we consider that there are
only two types of health care needs, and hence individuals have either a good or a
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bad medical disposition. Therefore, let M = {g, b} denote the set of all the possible
medical dispositions, with g < b. These two values are assumed to be fixed for
all possible allocations. Let mN = (mi )i∈N ∈ Mn be the population’s profile of
health dispositions.1 Note that the functional form of the health disposition entails
two simplifications. First, the trade-off between health and consumption, although not
equal, is linear for all individuals. Second, if the monetary resources are large enough,
all agents can eventually achieve the state of perfect health.
As regards the initial resources, all individuals are endowed with an equal income
ω ∈ R++ that they have to allocate between consumption and medical expenditure.
As we are already considering differences in health care needs, a factor for which
individuals will be compensated by society, we have opted to assume a unique value
for ω in order to provide a clearer intuition of the role that fresh starts play. This
monetary endowment is also assumed to be fixed for all possible allocations.
Finally, each individual has preferences over the available goods. However, as
we have mentioned in the Introduction, in taxation models it is usually assumed
that only income and expenditure are observable. Therefore, in order to be able to
analyse the redistribution of resources that the fresh start policy yields, let us first
describe an observable space that consists of consumption and total medical expen-
diture. Specifically, each individual i ∈ N has a consumption-expenditure bundle
xi = (ci , αi ) ∈ X = R2+ that designates the situation in which she has a level of
consumption ci and a total medical expenditure αi ∈ R+, which encompasses the
sum of both private and public resources allocated to the individual’s medical expen-
diture. Given her fixed health care needs mi , this sum of resources determines the
individual’s final level of health hi . Note that from the individual’s perspective this
definition of the model entails a one-to-one correspondence with respect to the space
of consumption and health. An allocation describes all the individuals’ bundles, that is,
xN = (xi )i∈N ∈ Xn . Let us then assume that every individual i ∈ N has well-defined
preferences Rmi over the consumption-expenditure space X , which are described by
a complete preorder. Moreover, preferences must also be continuous, convex and
strictly monotonic. Note that the preferences display the medical disposition since
agents may transform the medical expenditure into health in a different way. For any
individual i ∈ N , (c, α)Rmi (c′, α′) means that bundle (c, α) is weakly preferred to
bundle (c′, α′). Strict preference will be denoted by Pmi , and indifference will be
denoted by Imi . A profile of preferences in society is denoted by RN = (Rmi )i∈N .
The analysis of the design of a fresh start policy for a population endowed with
unobservable heterogeneous traits is a complex task. Consequently, to keep things
simple we introduce the following assumptions in the domain of admissible individual
preferences.
First, preferences related to the same medical disposition are required to satisfy
the single-crossing property. This implies that for any two individuals who differ
in their preferences, but not in their health care needs, any two indifference curves
cross no more than once. Let us make use of such a property to state that for any
(c, α), (c′, α′) ∈ X , j, k ∈ N and m j ,mk ∈ M such that m j = mk , individual
1 A group of objects aN = (ai )i∈N defines a list such as (a1, . . . , ai , . . . , an).
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preferences Rm j show a higher concern for health than the set Rmk , something we
denote by Rm j h Rmk , if they satisfy the following relations:
{
c′ > c and (c, α)Imk (c′, α′) ⇒ (c, α)Pm j (c′, α′),
c′ < c and (c, α)Im j (c′, α′) ⇒ (c, α)Pmk (c′, α′).
In other words, an agent j ∈ N is said to have a higher concern for health than any
other agent k ∈ N if, with the same health disposition, the former devotes a higher
share of the initial resources to medical expenditure than the latter. As a result of this,
individuals with the same health care needs can be ordered according to their prefer-
ences over the distribution of consumption and medical expenditure. However, since
agentsmay transform the total resources devoted to health in a differentway, something
that affects their assessment of consumption-expenditure bundles, the single-crossing
property is only assured among individuals who have the same health disposition.
Second, and in accordance with the previous assumption, let us consider that for
all medical dispositions there exists a fixed and finite number of concerns for health
F ≥ 2. Therefore, for any m ∈ M the set of individual preferences can be ranked
according to these concerns for health, with Rmf h Rmf −1 for any f ∈ {2, . . . , F}.
That is, among those endowed with m, an agent associated with a set of preferences
Rm1 has the lowest preference for health, an agent associated with a set R
m
2 the second
lowest, etc. and an agent associated with a concern RmF has the largest preference for
health. Let R = M × F denote the set of individual preferences that satisfy all the
properties presented above, and hence RN ∈ Rn .
Finally, we assume that agents make their choices according to some ex ante pref-
erences RaN = ((Rmi )a)i∈N ∈ Rn , although they get their final utility from an ex post
profile RtN = ((Rmi )t )i∈N ∈ Rn that may or may not coincide with their ex ante
preferences. Let us consider that any individual who ex post changes her preferences
becomes more concerned for health, that is, for all i ∈ N either (Rmi )t = (Rmi )a
or (Rmi )t h (Rmi )a . Additionally, for any Rmf , Rmf ′ ∈ R, where Rmf h Rmf ′ , there
exist individuals j, k ∈ N endowed with a health disposition m such that j sticks to
preferences Rmf , and individual k changes from R
m
f ′ to R
m
f . That is, for a given medical
disposition and a specific type of preferences there exist individuals who stick to this
specific type of preferences, and individuals who change to it from any other type that
show a lower concern for health.
In order to provide a clear intuition of the set of admissible individual preferences,
let us present a particular example of the utility function that agents may have. This
example, which is derived from Fleurbaey (2005b), establishes that an individual
endowed with a medical disposition m ∈ M has preferences Rmf ∈ R represented by
the utility function:





where δ f > 0 is a parameter that measures the individual concern for health. Note that
since agents actually care about health, the preferences show the way in which they
transform the medical expenditure into a final health state. Given that the preferences
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are depicted by a Cobb-Douglas utility function, the higher the value of δ f , the higher
the share of the initial endowment that an individual devotes to medical expenditure.
Hence, for a fixed set  = {δ1, . . . , δ f , . . . , δF }, where δ f > δ f −1, we say that an
agent who makes her choice according to δ ∈  exhibits a higher concern for health
than any other agent who makes her choice according to δ′ ∈ , if δ′ < δ. This
assertion is valid as long as both individuals are endowed with the same health care
needsMoreover, every agentwith amedical dispositionm ∈ Mmakes her choicewith
umf (c, α), but she derives utility from u
m
f +t (c, α), where t ≥ 0. That is, as we have
previously established, she either sticks to her choice or becomes more concerned
for health. Finally, the set of all possible individual preferences in this example is
R = {Rb1 , . . . , Rbf , . . . , RbF , Rg1 , . . . , Rgf , . . . , RgF }.
Returning to our theoretical framework, an economy is described by a list e =
(mN , ω, RtN ) ∈ E , where E denotes the set of all the economies that satisfy the
assumptions presented above. Social preferences permit us to compare allocations
in terms of forgiveness and responsibility for any economy. Such preferences are
denoted by R(e), and let us assume that they are described by a complete preorder.
xNR(e)x ′N means that allocation xN is at least as good as x ′N . The corresponding strict
social preference and social indifference relations are denoted by P(e) and by I(e),
respectively. It is important to remark that the definition of an economy entails that
ex ante preferences are the deciding factor in the determination of the allocations that
are going to be evaluated by society, but such preferences are later excluded from that
evaluation as it is considered that only final or ex post goals matter (see Fleurbaey
2005a; Calo-Blanco 2016).
After having defined the elements of the model, we now proceed to present the
social ordering function that the planner adopts to assess social welfare. To do so, let
us first introduce some key concepts. We start by defining the notion of full-health
equivalent consumption (FHEC), which is the smallest level of consumption that one
individualwould bewilling to accept, according to her ex post preferences, to exchange
her present bundle for one in which she has perfect health (see Fleurbaey 2005b):
Definition 1 For all i ∈ N , mi ∈ M, (Rmi )t ∈ R and xi ∈ X , the individual i’s
full-health equivalent consumption is the value cmifi (xi ) that satisfies:
cmifi (xi ) = min{c′ ∈ R+ | (c′,mih∗) (Rmi )t (ci , αi )},
where fi ∈ {1, . . . , F} denotes the concern for health associated with (Rmi )t .
Second, we introduce a concept that we name ρ-equivalent loss and which will
allow us to asses the well-being loss that any individual experiences as a result of not
being in an ‘ideal’ situation which entails neither regret nor health disabilities. Such
a situation, that we call the most preferred bundle, is defined as the choice that the
individual would make, according to her ex post preferences and her initial resources,
if she had the best medical disposition, that is, the good one. For any i ∈ N , let us
denote this most preferred bundle by x fi ∈ X . Given this ideal point, our measure of
individual well-being loss is constructed as follows:











































Note that this measure is defined in terms of the monetary difference that exists
between two situations in which the individual has perfect health, and hence inter-
personal comparisons can be reduced to assessments of levels of consumption (see
Fleurbaey and Schokkaert 2011). Specifically, the first value corresponds to the FHEC
associated with the individual’s most preferred bundle, a situation in which she would
be endowed with a good medical disposition. By contrast, the second value is the
FHEC related to the individual’s actual choice, which she selected with her ex ante
preferences according to her true medical disposition. Therefore, the ρ-equivalent
loss metric accounts for both, changes in the individual’s preferences and a bad health
disposition endowment. Let us make use of function ρmifi (xi ) to define the following
social ordering function:
Social ordering function 1
For all e ∈ E and xN , x ′N ∈ Xn ,
xNRlexρ (e)x
′




These social preferences rank first, in lexicographic terms, that allocation in which
the highest value of the ρ-equivalent loss across the population is the smallest (see
Calo-Blanco 2014 for the full characterisation of such a ranking). Figure 1 illustrates
this social ordering function.
Let us consider an economy in which there are only two individuals, j and k, and
the initial allocation is given by x ′N ∈ X2. Individual k’s choice, which she makes with
the preferences that show the lowest concern for health, is characterised by both the
good medical disposition and a complete absence of regret, and hence ρgfk (x
′
k) = 0.
Individual j alsomakes her choice with the preferences that exhibit the lowest concern
for health, but she is endowed with the worst medical disposition, that is, the bad one.
As a consequence of this she opts for a distribution x ′j of her total resources that entails
a larger level of consumption than x ′k . Moreover, she changes her preferences ex post
2 Where	L denotes the leximax criterion as proposed by Bossert et al. (1994). It establishes that a group of
objects aN ∈ Rn dominates any other group a′N ∈ Rn “if the highest value in aN is higher than the highest
value in a′N . If the highest values are identical, then society eliminates that value from the two allocations
and compares the highest values in the reduced allocations, and so on”.
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to another set Rb2 that is related to a higher concern for health. Therefore, her measure
of well-being loss, ρbf j (x
′
j ) > 0, encompasses the effects of the two factors for which
society wants to compensate individuals. According to Rlexρ , a redistribution policy
that induces an alternative allocation such as xN ∈ X2 improves social welfare, that is
xNPlexρ (e)x
′
N , because the highest ρ-equivalent loss in this new allocation is smaller
than the highest value in the initial one, as we can observe in Fig. 1. The task of
describing how to induce this alternative allocation by means of a fresh start policy
will be undertaken in the next section.
3 The fresh-start policy
So far we have presented a specific ranking that allows us to make welfare assessments
when society wants both to compensate individuals for their health care needs and to
give those who genuinely regret their choice a fresh start. After having made such a
presentation, we now deal with the objective of our paper, which is the analysis of an
incentive-compatible fresh start policy that satisfies this social ranking.
Let us then introduce a social planner who designs a policy that aims to minimise
the highest ρ-equivalent loss across individuals, as it was established by Rlexρ . This
policy is defined by means of a tax scheme that characterises transfers of resources
depending on the observable pieces of information (e.g., Fleurbaey and Maniquet
2006, 2007; Valletta 2014). Given the available pieces of information, the planner’s
tax scheme is defined as a function of the individual level of consumption, that is
τ(c) : [0, ω] → R. This scheme is used by the planner to design the optimal fresh
start policy by means of distorting any individual’s budget set, and hence her initial
choice. Specifically, when τ(c) > 0 the individual cannot invest in health as much
as she wishes because she faces an additional cost. Therefore, the tax can be used
as a way of inducing individuals to limit the share of the initial endowment that they
devote to non-medical consumption. On the contrary, the tax turns into a subsidy when
τ(c) < 0, and hence the individual can enjoy a level of medical expenditure which
is larger than the one she could have afforded after her outlay on consumption. Let
us stress that the subsidy can be solely devoted to pay additional health expenditure,
and hence it cannot be used to increase the non-medical consumption. In other words,
with the monetary resources collected from those who pay a strictly positive tax, the
planner funds a health service to treat all those agents who are not in a good health
state.
It is important to stress that any tax scheme that intervenes in the choice between
medical expenditure and consumption has very different impacts on individuals
depending on their preferences. On the one hand, this scheme limits those who want
to expend a large share of their resources on non-medical consumption. On the other
hand, agents who lead a healthy lifestyle are being forced to fund a public service that
they are less likely to use. The social planner’s aim is to find a fair balance between
these two factors.
Let us now formally define the set of all the bundles that any individual can afford
in the presence of a social planner:
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Definition 3 For all e ∈ E and i ∈ N , the individual i’s consumption-expenditure
feasible set under a tax scheme τ(c) : [0, ω] → R is:
B(c) = {(c, α) ∈ X | α ≤ ω − c − τ(c)}.
That is, the agent i’s budget set in space X is characterised by how the tax scheme
affects the individual’s level of medical expenditure after her choice of consumption.
The agent is said to be taxed (respectively subsidised) when her total expenditure, both
in consumption and in health, is lower (larger) than the initial endowment. Note that
ω− c− τ(c) defines the sum of both private and public resources allocated to medical
treatment, and hence αi = ω − ci − τ(ci ) for any i ∈ N . Such a sum determines the
agent i’s final health state, hi ∈ H , as a function of her health disposition. Formally:
hi = ω − ci − τ(ci )
mi
.
According to the standard optimal taxation approach (e.g., Fleurbaey andManiquet
2006, 2011), in order to have awell-defined fresh start policy the allocation induced by
the tax schememust satisfy the following two conditions. First, it has to be feasible, that
is
∑
i∈N (ci + αi ) ≤ nω. This implies that the total cost of the final allocationmust not
exceed the total monetary resources in the economy. Second, since individuals are free
to choose their level of consumption in a budget set modified by the tax function which
is identical for everybody, the allocation induced by the planner must be incentive-
compatible. This means that any agent i ∈ N has to end up with a bundle that she
ex ante prefers to the one that any other agent j ∈ N has. Formally, an allocation
xN ∈ Xn is said to be incentive-compatible if and only:3




(ck, αk) or c
m j
f j
(x j ) ≥ ck .
The intuition behind the first part of the definition of this second condition is rather
clear. Since what matters is the way in which the initial endowment is distributed,
every individual chooses a combination of consumption and medical expenditure that,
given her health disposition, provides her with the highest level of ex ante utility. Then,
if individual j ∈ N , whatever her health care needs are, preferred the combination
selected by any other agent k ∈ N to her actual choice, nothing would prevent the
former from choosing the bundle picked by k. Therefore, an allocation is incentive-
compatible if and only if no individual envies ex ante the bundle of any other agent.
The second part of the incentive-compatibility constraint, c
m j
f j
(x j ) ≥ ck , limits the use
of the condition itself for bundles that entail levels of medical expenditure which are
3 As Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2005) point out, “the theory of optimal taxation is more easily constructed
in terms of maximising a social ordering over possible tax schemes (or, more precisely, over the set of
incentive-compatible allocations). Therefore it is important to construct orderings over all allocations, and
not only to construct allocation rules”. Alternatively, one may relate this condition to the choice of both
an incentive-compatible social choice function (that is, a mechanism) and an admissible set of individual




above g ∈ M. Beyond this point individuals endowed with a good health disposition
cannot get additional utility from medical consumption, and hence their indifference
curves become completely flat showing, then, that additional health expenditure would
not increase their utility (see Fig. 1).
Once having defined the basic elements that characterise the tax scheme, let us now
present the implications of the planner’s fresh start policy. Those implications can be
summarised in the following theorem:
Theorem 1 For any economy e ∈ E , the tax scheme τ(c) : [0, ω] → R which induces
a feasible and incentive-compatible allocation xN ∈ Xn that minimises the highest
ρ-equivalent loss across individuals is such that:
(i) Perfect equality in terms of the ρ-equivalent loss can never be achieved, unless
the whole of the population is at the state of perfect health, and moreover the
FHEC related to themost preferred bundle is the same for all types of preferences.
(ii) The largest consumption is defined by an agent who selects her bundle with the
preferences that show the lowest concern for health, whereas the highest medical
expenditure is associated with someone who exhibits the highest concern for
health.
(iii) The highest ρ-equivalent loss is determined by someone endowed with a bad
health disposition, and who makes her choice with the preferences that show the
lowest concern for health. By contrast, the best-off in terms of the ρ-equivalent
loss is someone with a good health disposition who sticks to her ex ante prefer-
ences.
(iv) If the choice of consumption is independent of the medical disposition, the highest
tax is paid by someone who selects her bundle with the preferences that show the
largest concern for health.
The first conclusion of the implementation of the fresh start policy is that the full
egalitarian goal is unattainable, except in rather simple scenarios in which differences
in preferences play virtually no rolewhatsoever. Such an extreme result is originated by
the fact that the tax scheme must provide equal treatment to those who select the same
level of consumption. Then, any individual with a good medical disposition would
always mimic the behaviour of an agent who exhibits the same concern for health but
who is endowed with a bad medical disposition. By selecting the same choice than the
latter, the former would benefit from an extra medical treatment that was not originally
designed for her. This line of argument is always valid until the point in which the
scheme leads to a level of health that is equal to h∗ for all agents. In such a situation
the incentive-compatibility constraint would never be satisfied unless all individuals
had the same value of the FHEC associated with their own respective most preferred
bundle. This difficulty to achieve the full egalitarian goal was already pointed out by
Fleurbaey (2005a) as a consequence of the use of the incentive-compatible condition.
Nevertheless, in hismodel the egalitarian outcome is the optimal resultwhen the variety
of preferences is limited to only two types. In our health framework this particular
egalitarian result is not possible because, besides incentive-compatibility, we have
heterogeneity in health care needs as well.
The second point of the theorem deals with the extreme values of the goods in
the final allocation. The largest levels of medical expenditure and consumption are
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given, respectively, by individuals who present the highest and the lowest concern
for health. This outcome, which is relatively expected, arises from the combined
application of the incentive-compatibility constraint and the single-crossing property.
The most relevant part of this result is that individuals who define these largest values
can have any medical disposition, something that is owing to the fact that the single-
crossing property is not satisfied among individuals endowed with different health
care needs. Let us now show the intuition behind this second characterisation outcome
by focusing on the largest level of consumption across the population. To do so we
consider a specific case inwhich the bad health disposition agents who havemade their
initial choice with the type that exhibits the lowest concern for health, that is Rb1 , face
both a high price for health and a large preference for consumption. Therefore, their
indifference curveswould be too flatwith respect to the rest of the agents, and hence the
optimal tax scheme would assign them the highest level of consumption (this example
is depicted in Fig. 3 in the appendix). Specifically, since the price that they have to pay
for health is too large, the planner would opt to control the well-being loss of those
who stick to such a choice via increasing the utility that they derive from ordinary
consumption. By contrast, if the concern for health associated with Rm1 , for any m ∈
M, would not imply a relatively large preference for consumption the focus of the fresh
start policywould turn to thosewho change their preferences.Hence, the plannerwould
opt to grant the largest consumption to someone who has a good health disposition.
In that case the future regret of those endowed with a bad medical disposition would
be controlled by inducing them to increase their medical expenditure, limiting this
way the public resources that would be required to compensate them afterwards.
Consequently, depending on the interaction between the individuals’ preferences and
health dispositions, it is possible to obtain different characterisation results for the
extreme values of the final allocation. Note that this multiplicity of outcomes implies
that the highest health state, although it will be defined by someone who exhibits the
highest concern for health, cannot be associated with a particular medical disposition.
The third statement of Theorem 1 characterises both the worst-off and the best-
off individuals in terms of the reference comparable measure. The smallest level of
well-being across the population is determined by a bad health disposition agent who
has the ex ante preferences that show the lowest concern for health, and who may
or may not regret her choice. This is so because, due to the single-crossing property,
any agent who may possibly regret her choice will always outperform other agents
with the same health disposition who want the same bundle ex post, but who have ex
ante preferences that exhibit a smallest concern for health. Moreover, regretful good
medical disposition individuals who make their choice with Rg1 cannot determine the
highest ρ-equivalent loss either. The reason is that, since they have to pay the smallest
price for health, the planner could always reallocate resources in such a way that
these agents could be made better-off, increasing this way the social welfare. As a
result, the individual who marks the largest ρ-equivalent loss in society has to be
someone endowed with a bad medical disposition and who has made her choice with
Rb1 . Interestingly enough, this implies that it may be the case that the worst-off agent is
a steady individual (that is, someone who does not regret her choice) who is endowed
with a bad health disposition. This is so because the final value of the comparable
measure of utility does not depend on the ‘size’ of the change of preferences, but on
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the shape of the indifference curves that pass through the specificmost preferred bundle
and through the individual’s actual choice. By contrast, the intuition behind the result
of who defines the highest well-being across the population is rather clear. A steady
agent endowed with a good health disposition, whatever her concern for health, does
not suffer any of the factors which define the ρ-equivalent loss function. Moreover,
due to the incentive-compatible constraint, the tax scheme may additionally favour
this individual as she may now see it profitable to impersonate those who have a bad
health disposition in order to pay a smaller tax. Opposite to the framework developed
by Fleurbaey (2005a), in our model it is not possible to characterise the concern for
health related to the lowest ρ-equivalent loss across the population. Once again, this
is due to the fact that our comparable measure is specifically defined for each type of
preferences.
The principal result behind the fourth and last outcome of Theorem 1 is that it is
relatively complex to identify the individual who pays the largest tax. In line with what
we have previously argued, the fact that the single-crossing property is not satisfied
between agents with different health care needs may lead to a multiplicity of results.
After having stated this general multiplicity outcome, let us now derive a specific
characterisation result for a particular family of individual preferences.More precisely,
we will focus on those for which the choice of consumption does not depend on the
individual’s medical disposition. In this particular environment the optimal scheme
induces an agent who chooses her bundle with the type that shows the highest concern
for health to pay the highest tax. The reason is that such an agent has a clear advantage
with respect to the rest of individuals since she will never regret her choice.
Let us conclude our analysis by presenting a numerical example of how the
incentive-compatible fresh start policy may be designed in the redistribution frame-
work that we have just analysed. To do so we assume that individual preferences over
consumption and medical expenditure are described by the utility function that we
have introduced in Sect. 2, that is:





Let us consider that in this example there are only two concerns for health which
are described by the values δ2 = 1.5 > 0.5 = δ1. Additionally, each individual is
characterised by her health disposition, which can be either good, g = 1, or bad, b =
1.1. Therefore, the set of all possible individual preferences isR = {Rb1 , Rg1 , Rb2 , Rg2 }.
The initial endowment is identical for all agents, more precisely, ωi = 1 for all i ∈ N .
We assume, as it was previously established, that only individuals with concern δ1
may regret their choice. Additionally, we have that there exists one single agent per
eachpossible case that ourmodel considers (or that the population is equally distributed
among those cases). This implies a total of 6 different individuals that we proceed to
introduce. There are two agents with ex ante preferences with concern δ2, one with
a good health disposition (sg2 ) and another one with a bad health disposition (s
b
2 ). As
regards those with preferences associated with δ1, there are also good and bad health
disposition individuals, butmoreover some of themwill change ex post their type to δ2.
Hence, there exist agents with low health care needs that either stick to or regret their ex
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N ) τ (x
∗
N )
sg2 (0.400, 0.600) 0.600 0 (0.391, 0.587) 0.587 0.010 0.022
sb2 (0.400, 0.600) 0.545 0.025 (0.391, 0.587) 0.533 0.033 0.022
sg1 (0.667, 0.333) 0.333 0 (0.534, 0.477) 0.477 0.016 −0.011
rg1 (0.667, 0.333) 0.333 0.058 (0.534, 0.477) 0.477 0.010 −0.011
sb1 (0.667, 0.333) 0.303 0.018 (0.534, 0.477) 0.434 0.033 −0.011
rb1 (0.667, 0.333) 0.303 0.075 (0.534, 0.477) 0.434 0.033 −0.011
ante preferences. Let sg1 and r
g
1 denote such individuals respectively. The same applies
for those endowed with a bad health disposition, denoted by sb1 and r
b
1 respectively.
Therefore, the set of agents in this society is described by N = {sg2 , sb2 , sg1 , r g1 , sb1 , rb1 }.
Table 1 presents both the laissez-faire scenario and the results that emerge from the
implementation of the fresh start policy. Without the planner’s intervention, described





choose a lower level of consumption than the rest of the agents, albeit both sg2 and
sb2 will get a higher medical expenditure, and also a higher health state, in return.
Note that due to the specific utility function they choose the same distribution of the
initial income. As it is only natural, the agents who suffer no well-being loss are
those endowed with the best health disposition and who are properly maximising their
utilities, that is, sg2 and s
g
1 . As we have characterised in the previous section, the value
of the ρ-equivalent loss function is strictly positive for those who are endowed with a
bad health disposition (sb2 and s
b
1 ), for those who regret their choice (r
g
1 ), and for those
with both issues (rb1 ). In this laissez-faire scenario the worst-off agent is the one who
is affected by these two factors that society wants to compensate individuals for, that
is rb1 .
The results of the optimal fresh start policy are described, in Table 1, by allocation
x∗N . In this scenario, since the actual health state is not observable, the planner designs
a tax scheme that only depends on the individual level of consumption. This implies
that, for instance, individual sg2 can apply for the tax offered to any other agent as long
as she selects the same consumption than the latter. Since the choice of consumption
is independent of the medical disposition, agents with identical ex ante concern for
health select the same distribution of the total expenditure, regardless of their health
care needs. However, they do not end up with the same health state as they transform
the medical expenditure into health in a different way.
In order to reduce the maximum ρ-equivalent loss, the public authority taxes the
individuals whowill not regret their choice, namely, those who select their bundle with
the type that defines the highest concern for health, that is, δ2. Since individual s
g
2 is
also endowed with a good health disposition, it would be optimal to extract additional
resources from her. However, this cannot be done because she always mimics the
choice of sb2 , and hence the planner is constrained to reduce the tax that charges s
g
2 to
avoid harming sb2 , who is eventually forced to pay a positive tax. In order to control
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the individual well-being loss the planner induces specific levels of consumption and
also provides those who have a bad health disposition with an additional treatment.
For instance, to compensate the agents endowed with b ∈ M and who have ex ante
preferences associatedwith δ1, that is sb1 and r
b
1 , the planner designs an optimal scheme
such that they end up with less consumption than in x0N , but with a higher medical
expenditure as well. As one of them is going to experience a change in her preferences,
by reducing the level of consumption it is possible to limit her future utility loss. Given
the particular utility function that we have assumed, agents with the same ex ante
preferences but who are endowed with different health care needs, that is sg1 and s
b
1 ,
will get exactly the same bundle. As a consequence, they receive a subsidy to cover the
cost of an additional medical treatment. That is, sg1 takes advantage of the existence of
the group formed by the bad health disposition agents to get a more favourable deal
from the planner. Therefore, and in line with what we have learnt from our theoretical
results, the subsidies are funded by those agents who show the highest concern for
health; namely, sg2 and s
b
2 . Finally, to compensate the individual with the good health
disposition andwho regrets her choice, r g1 , the planner sets a redistribution scheme that
self-induces her to limit her level of consumption. Naturally, this measure comes at the
cost of reducing the utility of her steady counterpart sg1 . As predicted by Theorem 1,
perfect equality in terms of regret cannot be achieved, not even in such a simplified
society. Note that these incentive constraints that we have described here clearly limit
the scope of the planner’s intervention. For instance, due to such constraints agent sg2
pays a relatively low tax, whereas agent sg1 gets a subsidy.
Finally, in Fig. 2 we graphically describe the optimal allocation x∗N . Note that, given
the specific utility function that we have assumed, the indifference curves related to
g and b overlap with each other for each concern of health, although they represent
different levels of utility. As we have already discussed, we can directly observe in
the picture that the full egalitarian goal cannot be achieved. Individuals sg2 and r
g
1 ,
who enjoy the bundles xg2 ∈ X and xg1 ∈ X respectively, get a slightly lower well-
being than in their most preferred situation. As regards sg2 , she takes advantage of
the possibility of mimicking the behaviour of sb2 , who obtains x
b
2 ∈ X , an agent who
should be compensated for her bad health disposition. With respect to sg1 , whose final
choice is xg1 ∈ X , although she is worse-off than in x0N , she benefits from the existence
of a bad health disposition counterpart, that is sb1 , to get a fairly favourable deal. In
fact, she receives a subsidy to get additional health treatment. Therefore, the subsidy
obtained by the bad health disposition agents who make their choice with the concern
for health δ1 is quite limited. Moreover, note that the bundle x
g
2 is characterised by
a hypothetical budget line, or a tangency, with a slope equal to 1 with respect to the
indifference curve Rg2 (see Fig. 2). This implies that for those who make such a choice
it is not possible to obtain the same level of utility with a lower level of income. This
prevents the social planner from extracting additional resources from sg2 , and also
from sb2 , in order to reduce the ρ-equivalent loss of those choosing x
b
1 , that is, s
b
1 and
rb1 . Finally, a possible budget set (net of tax) that can induce this optimal allocation
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is the one depicted by the gray dotted line, which is defined as the envelope of the
indifference curves related to that optimal allocation.4
4 Concluding remarks
The idea of a fresh start is an ethical principle that advocates compensating those
individuals who regret their previous choices. Standard frameworks of fairness and
responsibility have barely studied this principle in relation to health. One exception
is Calo-Blanco (2014), who derives a social ordering function that combines both
approaches. Such an ordering, that is obtained by endorsing basic ethical principles,
entails minimising the highest well-being loss, which is defined by means of a specific
money metric. This metric is the distance, in terms of an equivalent consumption,
between the individual’s actual choice and a hypothetical ideal bundle which would
include neither regret nor health disabilities.
In this paper we have evaluated the consequences of the implementation of an
incentive-compatible fresh start policy which aims to maximise social preferences as
characterised by Calo-Blanco (2014). By focusing on a scenario in which the planner
cannot observe the agents’ health state, we have defined this fresh-start policy by
means of taxing consumption and subsidising extra medical expenditure. Our main
result is that the optimal tax scheme advocates balancing both, raising money through
taxation to treat all those agents who are not in a good health state, and providing
individuals with incentives to limit the share of the initial endowment that they can
devote to non-medical consumption.
Therefore, the theoretical framework that we have developed in this paper can be
useful to deal with some public health problems that western societies are currently
experiencing. For instance, in order to curb the soaring obesity rate, several national
governments, with the support of specialised agencies such as theWorld Health Orga-
nization, are starting to levy taxes on likely unhealthy goods like high-sugar foods.
These countries defend that the objective of this measure is twofold. On the one




hand, it aims to dissuade people from consuming goods that have been identified as
potentially harmful to their health. On the other hand, the tax can also be used to cut
healthcare costs and to increase revenues which can be devoted to healthy initiatives
as subsidising the price of low-sugar foods such as fresh fruits and vegetables.
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Appendix: Proof of Theorem 1
Let us start the proof by showing that, for any economy e ∈ E , in any ex post opti-
mal incentive-compatible allocation xN = (ci , αi )i∈N ∈ Xn all resources must be
exhausted, that is,
∑
i∈N (cxi +αxi ) = nω, where cxi and αxi are, respectively, the
individual i’s levels of consumption and total medical expenditure in that particular
allocation xN . Note that this condition is equivalent to establishing that
∑
i∈N τ(cxi ) =
0. Opposite to the desired result, let us consider an incentive-compatible allocation




i + αyi ) < nω.
If y j = yk for all j, k ∈ N , it is possible to define a parameter ε > 0 such that
if we replace the original allocation yN by yεN = (cyi + ε, αyi )i∈N , we obtain a new
feasible and incentive-compatible allocation in which, because of strict monotonicity,
all individuals are better-off.
Let us now deal with the case in which individuals do not have the same bundle, that
is, there exist j, k ∈ N such that y j = yk . Since the feasible space is defined in terms of
consumption and total medical expenditure, due to the incentive-compatible constraint
the final allocation must be distributed along the unique (net of tax) budget set. Let
us then focus on that individual who presents the largest expenditure on health. Due
to the monotonicity of the preferences and the incentive-compatible constraint, this
individualmust be associatedwith the smallest level of consumption. By providing this
agent with an additional small amount of consumption the social welfare increases. If
this extra consumption generates a problem with incentive-compatibility, it is always
possible to increase the utility of, at least, one of the individuals affected by this
constraint, without providing the other agents with incentives to change their choice.
Due to the single-crossing property, this can be done by moving the bundle that we
are considering, and that it triggers the incentive-compatibility problem, along the
indifference curve of that individual who has the option to apply for it. Hence, this
agent would remain indifferent between this new bundle and her actual choice.
Let us now proceed to prove the four different points of Theorem 1.
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(i) For any economy e ∈ E , to obtain that all agents who regret their choice end
up with the same well-being than those who stick to their initial preferences, it
must be the case that all bundles, but those related to the preferences RmF , for any
m ∈ M = {g, b}, are equal in terms of consumption and health.
Opposite to the desired result, let us assume that the ρ-equivalent loss is identical
for all agents, and that individuals endowed with a bad health disposition do
not have perfect health. Let xmf ∈ X denote the choice of any agent who has
a medical disposition m ∈ M and the ex ante type of preferences Rmf ∈ R.
Then, for any Rmf = RmF the bundle xbf ∈ X must be horizontally to the right
of xgf ∈ X (as depicted in Fig. 1), given that both choices entail the same health
state but g < b. However, due to incentive-compatibility, individuals with a good
health disposition would also apply for the additional medical expenditure that
was originally designed for those endowed with high health care needs. This is
so because the health state is private information, and hence the planner cannot
discriminate between agents who choose the same level of consumption.
This line of reasoning is only valid as long as the bundles associated with the
bad health disposition agents do not entail the state of perfect health. Otherwise,
someone endowed with g would not be able to get additional utility when imper-
sonating a bad health disposition individual. Therefore, let us now show that
when this group of agents (those endowed with a bad medical disposition) have
perfect health the full egalitarian goal cannot be achieved either. Let us present
this result by means of a simple example with just two concerns for health, that is
R = {Rb1 , Rb2 , Rg1 , Rg2 }, in which the final well-being loss is assumed to be equal
for all individuals. We additionally consider that every bad health disposition
agent has perfect health, and hence her bundle must be located in the indifference
curve of her good health disposition counterpart that passes through the choice
of this second agent. If xb1 = xb2 , we would have that either xb2 Pb1 xb1 or xb1 Pb2 xb2 ,
as the individuals only care about consumption since their health state is equal
to h∗, and hence incentive-compatibility would not be satisfied. In consequence,
it would have to be the case that xb1 = xb2 , but due to the single-crossing property




1 , and hence incentive-compatibility would not be
satisfied either.
Therefore, we are left only with the case in which all individuals, but those
who make their choice with the type RmF , for any m ∈ M, have the same level of
consumption and a perfect health state. In such a case, unless the FHECassociated
with the most preferred bundle is identical for all types, the ρ-equivalent loss
cannot be the same for all agents.
(ii) The fact that in the optimal allocation the extreme values of consumption and
medical expenditure are determined, respectively, by the lowest and the highest
concern for health is a consequence of the combined application of the incentive-
compatible constraint and the single-crossing property.
Let us now make use of a particular example to show that an individual endowed
with a bad health disposition can enjoy the highest consumption across the pop-
ulation. Specifically, let us consider a society with just two concerns for health,
that is R = {Rb1 , Rb2 , Rg1 , Rg2 }, in which all resources are exhausted (see Fig. 3).
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Additionally, we assume that for the type that shows the highest concern for
health the choice of consumption is independent of the medical disposition, and
hence all the indifference curves related to Rm2 , for anym ∈ M, overlap with one
another until the level of medical expenditure g. As we can observe in the picture,
the depicted allocation is incentive-compatible. We will show that it is impos-
sible to reallocate resources such that the maximum ρ-equivalent loss, which is
defined by ρb1 (x
b




1 ), is reduced. In order to lower this maximum value
the planner must increase the total expenditure related to xb1 , since this bundle is
tangent to a hypothetical line with a slope equal to 1 (see Fig. 3). Note that such
a tangency means that it is impossible to raise the well-being of the individual
who sticks to this bundle without increasing the total expenditure on her choice.
Therefore, the social plannermust extract resources from, at least, one of the other
agents who belong to this particular society. However, if the bundle xb1 is moved
to the shaded region of space X (see Fig. 3), due to the incentive-compatible
constraint, the rest of the agents in the economy would also apply for it, and
hence the allocation would not be feasible. In consequence, there are only two
regions (the lined ones) to which the bundle xb1 may be moved in order to reduce
the maximum ρ-equivalent loss. In each one of these two areas the monetary
value of, at least, one of the other bundles could be decreased without violating
incentive-compatibility. In the region that is closer to the vertical axis the planner
may try to reduce the total expenditure on xb2 and x
g
2 in order to increase the value
of xb1 . However, because of incentive-compatibility, the agents characterised by
Rg1 would also choose this new bundle x
b
1 . Therefore, depending on the number
of individuals who choose each option, the new allocation may not be feasible.
The same line of reasoning can be applied in the other lined region of the picture.
Finally, similar examples can be laid out to show that the extreme values of the
optimal allocation can be characterised by individuals endowedwith any possible
medical disposition.
(iii) Let us first show the characterisation of the highest ρ-equivalent loss across the
population. We start this proof by considering the group of steady agents (that is,
those who do not regret their initial choice) who are endowed with a good health
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disposition. By incentive-compatibility, they can never be worse-off than the
steady bad health disposition individuals who have the same concern for health.
Let us now analyse this second group, that is, the steady agents endowed with
a bad medical disposition. Because of the incentive-compatible constraint and
the single-crossing property, those with preferences Rbf = Rb1 must be better-off
than the regretful bad health disposition agents who choose with preferences Rbf1 ,
where Rbf h Rbf1 , and who ex post substitute them for Rbf . Consequently, let us
focus on the group of individuals who regret their initial choice. As regards the
good health disposition individuals, for any pair Rgf , R
g
f1
∈ R, where Rgf h Rgf1 ,
there exists a third type Rgf2 ∈ R with R
g
f2
h Rgf such that, because of the
incentive-compatible constraint and the single-crossing property, it must be the
case that ρgf2(x
g
f ) < ρ
g
f2
(xgf1). This argument is valid for all agents but those
making their choice with Rg1 . Moreover, note that by definition there are no
regretful agents with ex ante preferences RgF . The same line of reasoning can be
applied to the bad health disposition agents who regret their initial choice.
In consequence, in order to characterise the largest ρ-equivalent loss we must
focus on those individuals who choose their bundle with the type of preferences
that show the lowest concern for health. Hence, we are left with only two possible
cases for the determination of the highest ρ-equivalent loss in the society; namely,
ρbf (x
b
1 ) and ρ
g
f0
(xg1 ), where R
b
f ∈ R and Rgf0 ∈ R\{R
g
1 }.
Let us now show that whenever maxi∈N ρmifi (xi ) = ρ
g
f0




there exists a type Rbf ∈ R, such that ρbf (xb1 ) = ρgf0(x
g
1 ). Opposite to the desired
outcome, let us assume that ρgf0(x
g
1 ) defines the strictly largest ρ-equivalent loss
in the society. Since all agents must select their bundle along the unique (net of
tax) consumption-expenditure budget line, the highest level of consumption must
be defined by someone who has the preferences that show the lowest concern for
health (see the proof of Theorem 1.i i). Moreover, since ρgf0(x
g




the level of consumption associated with bundle xg1 must be larger than the one




















for all Rgf ∈ R\{Rg1 }. Let us now show that in such a scenario it is always
possible to save resources, without increasing the highest ρ-equivalent loss, until
we obtain that ρbf (x
b
1 ) = ρgf0(x
g
1 ) for some R
b
f ∈ R. If there were no incentive-
compatibility problems, we could just reduce the consumption in the bundle xb1
until we directly reached the desired result. Nevertheless, due to the incentive-
compatible constraint, it may happen that when changing xb1 those who had
previously selected this bundle would opt to substitute it for xmf1 , which would
be related to a set Rmf1 ∈ R, where m ∈ M. Then, we could additionally reduce
the level of consumption of all those bundles that may provide any agent with
incentives to misreport their real ex ante preferences. However, at some point the
very xg1 might be the bundle blocking further reductions in consumption. In such
a case we could move xg1 rightwards along the indifference curve R
g
f0
, as long as
the slope at that point were smaller than | − 1|, that is, provided that the bundle
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Fig. 4 Proof of Theorem 1.iii:

















(x) = ρgf0 (x
g
1)
were distorted to the left with respect to that specific type of preferences (see
Fig. 4).5 This movement would save resources without increasing the highest ρ-
equivalent loss, that isρgf0(x
g
1 ), and itwould alsomake room for further reductions
in the level of consumption associated with other bundles. If there existed any
other bundle that, because of the incentive-compatible constraint, would prevent
us from implementing such a movement, we could also reduce the value of that
bundle. Note that, since the maximum ρ-equivalent loss is given by ρgf0(x
g
1 ),
there would be no other bundle below the indifference curve related to Rgf0 that




a higher ρ-equivalent loss. If, on the contrary, the slope in xg1 with respect to R
g
f0
were equal to or higher than | − 1| it would be possible to move xb1 , and any
other possible bundle equal to it, backwards along Rb1 and save some resources
without increasing the highest ρ-equivalent loss (see Fig. 4). By implementing
such a movement the bundle xb1 would become closer to x
g
1 , and hence the levels
of regret would converge to the same value even before the bundles became
identical. Therefore, the highest level of regret would be determined by a value
ρbf (x
b
1 ), for some R
b
f ∈ R, that equalled ρgf0(x
g
1 ).
Let us finish this proof of the third statement of Theorem 1 by analysing the
lowest ρ-equivalent loss across the population. Due to the incentive-compatible
constraint, for any steady bad health disposition individualwith preferences Rbf ∈
R there exists another good health disposition agent with the same concern for
health who, by definition, cannot be worse-off. With respect to the regretful




∈ R it must be the case that xgf Rgf xgf1 . Therefore, when one individual
with a good health disposition changes preferences from Rgf1 to R
g
f , she can
never end up with a higher well-being than another agent with the same medical
disposition and who sticks to the type Rgf . By combining these arguments that
we have just applied, one can easily show that the regretful bad health disposition
agents cannot determine the lowest well-being loss in the society either. Finally,
5 For any m ∈ M, a bundle x ∈ X is said to be distorted to the left (respectively to the right) with respect
to the type Rmf ∈ R if there exists another bundle x ′ ∈ X such that x Imf x ′, c + α > c′ + α′, and moreover
c > c′ (respectively c < c′).
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the part of the statement which enunciates that the best-off individual can exhibit
any type of preferences is due, once again, to the specific shape of the set of
indifference curves that defines each type Rmf ∈ R, where m ∈ M.
(iv) In the present proof we focus on the set of feasible preferences for which the
choice of consumption is independent of the medical disposition. In this partic-
ular scenario individuals who share the concern for health will choose the same
expenditure on consumption, whatever their health care needs are. Therefore, for
all m ∈ M and Rmf ∈ R we have that xgf = xbf = x f . Opposite to the desired
result, let us assume that there exists a bundle x f ∈ X related to the concern for
health Rmf = RmF , such that maxi∈N τ(ci ) = τ(c f ) > τ(cF ), where c f is the
level of consumption associated with the choice x f . Note that since the choice of
consumption is independent of the medical disposition the single-crossing prop-
erty is fully satisfied in the present scenario. Therefore, the bundle x f has to be
located in the tangency of the hypothetical line defined by τ(c f ), that is, it must
be distorted neither to the left nor to the right with respect to the type Rmf . If it
is distorted to the left, one can move x f to the right, along the indifference curve
belonging to the type Rmf , and save some resources without increasing the highest
ρ-equivalent loss. If there existed any bundle x f +t ∈ X , where t > 0, that due
to incentive-compatibility prevented us from moving x f , it would have to be the
case that this bundle x f +t were distorted to the right. Hence, the final well-being
of those who would choose such a bundle could be obtained with a smaller total
expenditure. In the case in which x f were distorted to the right we could apply a
similar line of reasoning, but moving the bundle leftwards. Let us only describe
the case in which Rmf = Rm1 , as by moving x1 ∈ X leftwards the maximum
ρ-equivalent loss might increase if its value were determined by someone who
regretted this specific choice. According to the initial assumptions, the tax paid
by the agent with the ex ante preferences Rmf1 h Rm1 who would characterise the
maximum ρ-equivalent loss is lower than the tax paid by those who had selected
x1. Hence, and similar to what we have done in the proof of Theorem 1.iii, we
could subtract resources from x f1 , and from other bundles that might prevent us
from satisfying the incentive-compatible constraint, until we reached a situation
in which the tax paid by x1 would no longer be the highest one.
Consequently, the bundle x f would have to be neutral with respect to the type of
preferences Rmf , that is, it would have to be distorted neither to the right nor to the left.
This would imply that the bundle would have to be located in the tangency between
the indifference curve belonging to Rmf that would pass through it, and a hypothetical
line which would be defined by the tax related to x f , that is τ(c f ). Then, for all
t ≥ 0 we could reduce the value of all the bundles x f +t+1 ∈ X until we obtained that
x f +t+1 Imf +t+1x f +t . This movement would both save resources and respect incentive-
compatibility, but moreover it would not increase the highest ρ-equivalent loss, which
would still be defined by ρmf1(x1), for some R
m
f1
∈ R. However, because of the single-
crossing property and the convexity of the preferences, the bundle xF ∈ X would entail
a lower total expenditure than x f , and hence it would be associated with a higher tax.
Finally, it is important to stress that for levels of medical expenditure which are
above g ∈ M the single-crossing property might not be satisfied between agents with
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different preferences if they do not have the same health care needs. However, the
property is always satisfied among the bad health disposition individuals for the whole
of the space X . Moreover, because of the properties of the individual preferences, an
indifference curve associated with a bad health disposition agent belonging to RbF ∈ R
cannot cross more than once the curve of another individual with a lower concern for
health, whatever her health care needs are. Therefore, the previous line of reasoning
would still be valid.
References
Arneson R (1989) Equality and equal opportunity for welfare. Philos Stud 56:77–93
Atkinson AB (1995) Public Economics in Action. Clarendon Press, Oxford
Bossert W, Pattanaik PK, Xu Y (1994) Ranking opportunity sets: an axiomatic approach. J Econ Theory
63:326–345
Calo-Blanco A (2014) Fairness, freedom, and forgiveness in health care. Soc Choice Welf 43:141–151
Calo-Blanco A (2016) Fair compensation with different social concerns for forgiveness. Rev Econ Des
20:39–56
Cohen GA (1989) On the currency of egalitarian justice. Ethics 99:906–944
Diamond P (1998) Optimal income taxation: an example with a U-shaped pattern of optimal marginal tax
rates. Am Econ Rev 88:83–95
Dworkin R (1981a) What is equality? Part 1: equality of welfare. Philos Public Affairs 10:185–246
Dworkin R (1981b) What is equality? Part 2: equality of resources. Philos Public Affairs 10:283–345
Dworkin R (2000) Sovereign virtue: The theory and practice of equality. Harvard University Press, Cam-
bridge
Dworkin R (2002) Sovereign virtue revisited. Ethics 113:106–143
Fleurbaey M (2002) Equality of resources revisited. Ethics 113:82–105
Fleurbaey M (2005a) Freedom with forgiveness. Politics Philos Econ 4:29–67
Fleurbaey M (2005b) Health, wealth, and fairness. J Public Econ Theory 7:253–284
Fleurbaey M (2008) Fairness, responsibility, and welfare. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Fleurbaey M, Maniquet F (2005) Fair social orderings when agents have unequal production skills. Soc
Choice Welf 24:93–127
Fleurbaey M, Maniquet F (2006) Fair income tax. Rev Econ Stud 73:55–83
Fleurbaey M, Maniquet F (2007) Help the low skilled or let the hardworking thrive? A study of fairness in
optimal income taxation. J Public Econ Theory 9:467–500
Fleurbaey M, Maniquet F (2011) A theory of fairness and social welfare. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge
Fleurbaey M, Schokkaert E (2011) Equity in health and health care. In: Pauly MV, Mcguire TG, Barros PP
(eds) Handbook of Health Economics 2. North-Holland, pp 1003–1092
Mirrlees JA (1971) An exploration in the theory of optimum income taxation. Rev Econ Stud 38:175–208
Rawls J (1971) A theory of justice. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Roemer JE (1998) Equality of opportunity. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Valletta G (2014) Health, freedom and taxation. Soc Choice Welf 43:101–140
123
